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3.1  Introduction 
In the past few years there has been increasing interest in shifting from an 
income-based tax system in the United States to a consumption-based system. 
These tax reforms take a number of forms. Many advocate an increase in the 
availability of tax-sheltered savings (e.g., expanded IRAs), while others advo- 
cate value added taxation. Still others argue for either a broad-based consump- 
tion tax or a consumed income tax.’ All argue that substantial welfare gains 
result from the reduction  in taxation of capital income. On the other hand, 
some have argued that a shift from income to consumption taxation will lead 
to a lower real wage, which in turn will decrease labor supply. 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the labor supply and welfare ef- 
fects of a shift from income to consumption taxation. The first point of the 
paper is that labor supply effects of a shift to consumption taxation are likely 
to be small. As part of that discussion, I identify the significant parameters that 
analysts must know in order to identify the labor supply effects. It turns out 
that our knowledge of the relevant parameters is sketchy at best and a better 
understanding of labor supply responses is unlikely to occur without more em- 
pirical work. 
Gilbert E. Metcalf is assistant professor of economics at Tufts University and a faculty research 
fellow of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
The author appreciates  the  thoughtful  comments and suggestions of  Gary Burtless, Martin 
Feldstein, James Poterba, and conference participants. 
1.  Rep.  Dick  Armey  has  proposed  the  “Freedom  and Fairness  Restoration  Act,”  a  Hall- 
Rabushka-style flat consumption tax. Senators Nunn and Domenici’s  proposed “USA Tax System” 
is a consumed income tax. The Republican Congress’s “Contract with America” would extend 
IRA treatment to all families and allow withdrawals for first-time home purchases, higher educa- 
tion expenses, medical expenses, or long-term care insurance premiums. The Contract would also 
provide a 50 percent long-term capital gains deduction (see U.S. Congress 1995 for a description 
of the tax proposals contained in the Contract with America). 
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Second, I note that the welfare effects of a change from income to consump- 
tion taxation depend importantly on the breadth of consumption taxation. Pre- 
vious investigations of a shift from income to consumption taxation have as- 
sumed  that  all  income  was  taxed  under  the  former  tax  system  and  all 
consumption  is potentially taxed  under the latter system. In the real  world, 
not all income is taxed. Specifically, not all saving is taxed. Moreover, not all 
consumption  is  necessarily  taxed  under  consumption  taxation. As Metcalf 
(1995) notes in a survey of value added taxation, a wide range of consumption 
goods  are  zero  rated  in  European  value  added  taxes  (VATS). The Nunn- 
Domenici consumed income tax plan explicitly exempts housing consumption 
from the tax base (see Christian and Schutzer  1995 for details of  this plan). 
Hence the shift from income to consumption taxation may not reduce the inter- 
temporal consumption distortion at the same time that it may dramatically in- 
crease the intracommodity distortion. The welfare effects of the change depend 
to a large degree on which goods are untaxed; conceivably, the tax-preferred 
consumption goods are untaxed based on optimal tax considerations. A more 
cynical perspective suggests that there may be little correlation between opti- 
mal tax rates and actual tax rates in a narrow-based consumption tax. 
I present a number of simulation results to illustrate these points. The simu- 
lations build on a particular structure of preferences, and no attempt is made 
to claim generality in the results. Rather the point is to make plausible state- 
ments about behavioral responses and welfare effects and to identify the vari- 
ous elasticities that researchers need to measure in order to make definitive 
statements about the effects of a shift from income to consumption taxation. If 
anything, this paper identifies what we do not know more than it adds to what 
we do know. But before we can answer questions we need to know what ques- 
tions to ask. 
Section 3.2  provides some theoretical considerations relevant to a shift from 
income to consumption taxation, followed by  section 3.3., which develops a 
specific example using a nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility 
function. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 consider the welfare effects of a change from 
incomplete income to incomplete consumption taxation. The last section con- 
cludes with thoughts about directions for research. 
3.2  Labor Supply, Welfare, and a Revenue-Neutral Tax Reform 
I begin by considering a general two-period model in which an individual 
maximizes utility of consumption and leisure over two periods. I assume that 
all labor supply occurs in the first period, The individual maximization prob- 
lem is 
max U(C,,  C,,  1 -  L)  subject to 
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I have normalized the gross wage rate and the price of current consumption to 
1. There is a total of one unit of time endowment that can be allocated to labor 
(L)  or leisure (1 -  L).  The price of future consumption is determined by the 
after-tax rate of return (1 -  TJK In this simple framework, we can implement 
a consumption tax either by taxing consumption directly or by taxing wage 
income.z The fact that a consumption tax decreases the real wage creates the 
possibility  that a VAT  could have labor supply effects. To  reiterate, the key 
difference between a consumption tax and an income tax is the tax treatment 
of savings. The former does not tax savings while the latter does. 
There are a number of  tax reforms incorporating a consumption tax that 
could be implemented. One reform would be to shift from the current hybrid 
income-consumption  tax  system to a consumed  income tax. That could be 
done by eliminating the tax on interest income (setting T,  to 0) and increasing 
the tax on wage income  (TJ to maintain  revenue neutrality. Alternatively, a 
number of  different VATS could be implemented with their key distinguishing 
feature being the extent of zero-rated commodities. 
How will a general tax reform (dR)  affect labor supply? Slemrod (1987) 
considers this issue in a model in which cross-price effects are ign~red.~  Fol- 
lowing Slemrod, we can decompose the individual labor supply response (dL) 
as follows: 
dL -  aEdw  aEdp  aLdY  ---+--+-- 
dR  aw dR  ap dR  aY dR’  (2) 
where the superscript c indicates a compensated response and Y is income. We 
can add up over individuals to measure the aggregate labor supply response: 
(3) 
If the tax reform is revenue neutral, then C dY/dR will equal zero, and the last 
term in equation (3) is proportional to Cov (aL/dI: dY/dR).  The presence of 
this covariance term in equation (3) means that aggregate revenue neutrality 
does not imply the lack of  an income effect on labor supply from a tax reform. 
For example, if the tax reform shifted the tax burden from groups with large 
income elasticities to those with small income elasticities, the aggregate in- 
come effect would be to increase aggregate labor supply. The ability to shift 
burdens across taxpayer groups allows for this possibility. If, however, the addi- 
dL  aLcdw  dLc dp  aLdY 
dR  aw dR  ap dR  aYdR  c -- = c -  -  + c -  -  +  --. 
2. I am ignoring transitional issues by levying the tax at the beginning of the individual’s life. 
3.  His analysis looks at tax reforms that are unlikely to have significant price effects across com- 
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tional restriction of distributional neutrality is imposed, then the scope for ag- 
gregate income effects on labor supply is reduced.  Distributional neutrality 
means that revenue collected from narrower  income groups (e.g., quintiles) 
must be unaffected by the reform. Now, only shifts in tax burden within the 
narrower group can be used to generate an aggregate income effect. It is un- 
likely that there will be sufficient systematic variation in income elasticities 
within groups to generate an aggregate income effect. In this case, changes in 
aggregate labor supply will be driven by compensated responses: 
(4) 
Equation (4) tells us that the response of  labor supply to changes in the tax 
system will be driven by  (1) the compensated elasticity of labor supply with 
respect to the net wage and (2) the compensated cross-price elasticity of labor 
supply with respect to the price of future consumption. 
Our choice of first-period consumption as the numeraire is arbitrary. If we 
had  chosen  labor  as the  numeraire,  then  labor  supply responses  would  be 
driven by changes in the prices of first- and second-period consumption. There- 
fore, the direction of labor supply effects will be driven by the relative comple- 
mentary of current and future consumption with labor supply. That aggregate 
labor  supply response  depends on  cross-price elasticities  is  troubling.  Our 
knowledge of these elasticities is sketchy at best. One effort to measure cross- 
price effects  suggests that they may  be  important. Using  12 years of panel 
data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), Fullerton and Skinner 
(1985) estimate a demand system for consumption and leisure in which they 
include cross-price effects (lead and lags in wages and interest rates) in both 
equations. They find that cross-price effects are generally statistically 4gnifi- 
cant. Focusing on their leisure equation, a fall in future consumption prices 
(rise  in  the  real  rate  of  return  one  or  two  periods  ahead)  increases  labor 
supply-leisure  and future consumption appear to be substitutes. 
The importance of cross-price elasticities can be seen by considering a shift 
from our current tax system to a consumed income tax system. The tax rate on 
interest income (7,) is set to zero, and T~ is increased to maintain budget neu- 
trality. This corresponds to the wage rate and the price of future consumption 
falling. If  labor supply (leisure) is a complement  (substitute) to future con- 
sumption (as suggested by Fullerton and Skinner 1985), then this tax reform 
could increase labor  upp ply.^ 
An example with Stone-Geary utility illustrates how these two components 
4. This was pointed out early on by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976), who note in the optimal tax 
context that “whether there should be an interest income tax or subsidy depends on the comple- 
mentarity or substitutability (in the Edgeworth sense) between the first-period consumption and 
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of the labor supply response can work at cross-purposes. Assume that utility is 
given by 
(5) 
The ys are the required consumption parameters of current and future con- 
sumption and leisure, while the  Ps are share parameters and are assumed to 
add to 1. As is well known, a limitation of  the Stone-Geary utility system is 
that all goods must be substitutes. In that case the first term in equation (4) 
will be negative (wage reduction reduces labor supply) while the second term 
will be positive (the decrease in the price of future consumption will lead to a 
substitution away from leisure: labor supply  increase^).^ For a revenue-neutral 
tax  response,  these two  effects  will  exactly  offset, leading to  a zero labor 
supply response. This simply follows from the weak separability between lei- 
sure and consumption in the linear expenditure system. If we are going to get 
any labor supply response at all, we must choose preferences in which we have 
not built in weak separability. 
As noted in the discussion of equation (l), a consumption tax is equivalent 
to a wage tax (ignoring transitional issues). An income tax, on the other hand, 
amounts to a commodity tax with a higher tax rate on future consumption. 
Nearly 20 years ago, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) characterized conditions un- 
der which uniform treatment of present and future consumption is optimal. If 
(1) preferences are weakly separable between leisure and consumption and (2) 
nonlinear income taxes are possible, then there should be no differentiated tax 
rates on present  and  future consumption.  This result  has  been  extended to 
allow for linear income taxes if preferences also exhibit linear Engle curves.h 
This separability result initially led public finance economists to conclude 
that income taxation  was inefficient  and undesirable. Weak separability was 
enshrined in the discipline because it followed directly from the most com- 
monly employed utility functions (Cobb-Douglas, CES, and Stone-Geary). Of 
course, this is a limitation, and economists began to seek more flexible func- 
tional forms that do not impose an optimal tax result from the outset. Deaton 
and Muellbauer (1980) provide  one example with the  almost ideal demand 
system (AIDS). More to the point, the data do not support weak separability 
(see, e.g., Browning and Meghir 1991). Hence whether a switch from an in- 
come tax to a consumption tax would improve welfare is an empirical matter. 
The presumption in favor of consumption taxation must also be tempered by 
lJ = P1ln(C, -  Yl) + P,ln(C, -  Y*)  + P,ln((l -  L) -  Y3). 
5. It is easy to show that the compensated effect of the tax reform for the Stone-Geary system 
is given by 
where 1 is leisure. 
6.  Among other sources for this result, see Deaton (1976). 82  Gilbert E. Metcalf 
the likelihood that a considerable fraction of  consumption  is unlikely  to be 
taxed under any of the schemes under discussion. 
3.3  Simulations and Labor Supply 
I model consumer behavior with a time separable nested CES function. Util- 
ity for an individual is given by 
(6)  u  = [(yl/Pv  (PVlYP + (1 -  (II)"Pv,'P-I)iP]p/(P-l), 
where aggregate consumption in each period (u,)  is modeled as 
v,  = [pf", c'0,-lY0~  + (1 -  pl)'/Ux l;u,-lYu,  utl(ur-l)  (7)  17 
subject to the lifetime budget constraint 
(8)  w,T, + w2T* = WIZ, + w21,  + PICl  + p2c2. 
Consumers  optimize by  choosing consumption  in  each of  two periods  (C,) 
along with leisure  (5).  They face consumption prices p, and wage rates  w8. 
Their time endowment in each period equals T. 
This formulation is quite general; nesting consumption and leisure within 
each time period allows the possibility of leisure affecting the marginal rate of 
substitution between current and future consumption. That is, weak separabil- 
ity is not built into this model. The parameter  p measures the intertemporal 
elasticity  of  substitution between  aggregate consumption  bundles,  while  u, 
measures  the  elasticity of  substitution between  leisure  and consumption  in 
each time period. 
We can compute the marginal rate of substitution between current and future 
consumption directly. It is given by 
(9) 
Since v,  is a function of  I,, weak separability between consumption and leisure 
is avoided so long as the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is not equal to 
either of the intracommodity elasticities of substitution. 
The budget in equation (8) says that the value of the lifetime time endow- 
ment can be allocated to leisure and consumption in each period. The wage 
rate in each period is net of  the tax on labor income. Taking the first-period 
price of consumption as the numeraire, w,  equals the second-period net-of-tax 
wage discounted to the first period by the after-tax rate of return. Similarly, the 
price of  C,  is the period-two price discounted by the after-tax return. At this 
stage, I will treat consumption as a composite good with price 1. Thus C is the 
expenditure on consumption in each period. If  we define  Y as lifetime full 
income (net of tax) and q, as the (shadow) price of aggregate consumption, we 
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(10)  y= 41"l  + 42V2. 
Solving the first-stage maximization problem (treating aggregate consump- 
tion as the argument) yields demand functions 
(11) 
aY 
vl =  -~  qy[aq;-P + (1 -  a)q;-p]' 
qgaqt-p + (1 -  a)q;-p]' 
(1 -  a)Y 
v* = 
Ignoring time subscripts, the within-period optimization problem uses the bud- 
get constraint 
(12) 
The demand functions for C and 1 are given by 
(13) 
pc  + wl = qv. 
P(P) 
p"[Pp'-" + (1 -  p)wl--]' 
(1 -  P)(qv) 
w"[pp'-o  + (1 -  p)wl-"]' 
C= 
1= 
To  run simulations, we need values for the parameters of the utility func- 
tions. I will choose parameter values in part based on estimates in the literature 
and in part based on calibration using data from 1989 Consumer Expenditure 
Survey (CEX). 
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) review the literature on the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution and note that parameter estimates range from 0.07 to 
over 1  .OO.  I follow Auerbach and Kotlikoff and choose p = 0.25. 
The parameters u,  and p, will affect the household's labor supply elasticity 
and labor-leisure  allocation. The leisure-consumption  elasticity (a)  can per- 
haps be best chosen by determining the resultant labor supply elasticities. The 
elasticity u  measures the percentage change in the leisure consumption ratio 
in any year following a 1 percent change in the wage-price ratio, holding other 
prices constant. If  consumption were unchanged, u  would measure the labor 
supply elasticity directly. However, since consumption will adjust as the wage 
changes, we need to measure the labor supply responsiveness explicitly to re- 
late the elasticity of labor supply to the elasticity of substitution between con- 
sumption and leisure. I follow Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) and choose a 
value of u  equal to 0.8. Finally, the parameter (Y measures time preferences for 
the individual, and I choose a central value for this parameter equal to 0.50. 
Equations (13) can be combined to provide an expression for p: 84  Gilbert E. Metcalf 
Average expenditures on consumption when young provide a value for C,, 
while p  equals 1 in period one.’ To complete our computation of p, we  need 
estimates of wage rates and leisure. 
To compute leisure, I turn to the CEX. The CEX asks household members 
how many hours they worked in the past week. I take this from the family file 
for the reference member of the household and the spouse (if present). I check 
for the presence of regular work and adjust the reported labor supply figure 
accordingly.8 To  simplify  the  analysis, I  assume that  second-period labor 
supply equals zero. Based on CEX data for 1989, a small percentage of elderly 
households report hours (29 percent), and their average-conditional  on work- 
ing-is  roughly 30 hours per week. Within this group, many will only work 
for a small part of the year. 
I assume a time endowment of 5,000 hours per year and subtract the esti- 
mated labor supply from the endowment to compute leisure. Table 3.1 provides 
some distributional information on labor supply across different categories of 
workers. Roughly 70 percent of  the household heads age 30 or over in the 
CEX family file report hours worked. Conditional on reporting hours, the mean 
hours are 2,055 per year, with the median occumng at 2,000 hours per year.9 
Nearly 93 percent of the households with household head between ages 30 and 
60 report hours, with mean hours just under 2,000 per year. 
To compute the gross (of tax) wage rate, I use data from the CEX household 
member file. Those household members currently working are asked how large 
their most recent paycheck was. I divide this amount by the number of hours 
worked in the previous week after adjusting the paycheck by  the frequency of 
payment. I then regress the log of the wage on age, age squared, and dummy 
variables for sex and race, as well as indicators for whether the household 
member is divorced or single. There are 6,072 usable observations with which 
I can run the regression. Results are reported in table 3.2. Wage increases with 
age until about age 46, after which it begins to fall. At age 30 wages are in- 
creasing a bit less than 4 percent per year. Women  have  wages roughly 30 
percent lower than men after controlling for age, race, and marital status. Non- 
whites earn roughly 6 percent less, as do divorced and single men. The results 
are statistically significant and plausible. 
The regression results from table 3.2 are applied to the reference person and 
spouse (if present) in the family files. Column (1) of table 3.3 reports summary 
statistics on the generated wage used in the wage regression in table 3.2. Col- 
7. I consider time periods of 30 years so that effective adult life equals 80 years. Think of an 
individual living for 20 years as a child followed by two 30-year periods of different work amounts. 
Death occurs at age 80 (60 in economic years). For purposes of compounding savings, I take the 
midpoint of the first time period. 
8. The CEX asks household members how many weeks they worked the previous year. It also 
asks if they worked part or full time for part or all of the previous year. 
9. The CEX reports weekly hours. I multiply by 50 to obtain annual values. 85  Shift from Income to Consumption Taxation 
Table 3.1  Labor Supply Statistics across Age Groups 
All  Young' 
Average labor supply  1,439 
(1,080) 
Average labor supply conditional on L >  0  2,055 
(633) 
Percentage with L > 0 
25"  Percentileb  2,000 
5OCh  Percentileb  2,000 
75Ih Percentileb  2,375 
N  1,422 
70.0 
Source  Data from 1989 CEX famly file 
Note  Numbers in parentheses are standard deviatlons 
8Age 30-60 
bPercentiles are conditional on L  >  0 
Table 3.2  Wage Regressions: Dependent Variable = Log (wage) 























-  .059 
-.061 
6,072 
Source: Data from 1989 CEX household member file. 
Note: Wage is computed as last gross paycheck divided by the number of hours in the pay period. 
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. All estimated coefficients are significant at the 95 
percent level. 
umn (2) presents summary statistics for the reference member in the family 
file. The mean wage is roughly $1.50 per hour lower in the family file, re- 
flecting the fact that wages are being imputed to workers and nonworkers alike. 
Also, the age distribution of individuals differs across the family and member 
files. The mean age in the family file equals 36.9 years, while it equals 49 years 86  Gilbert E. Metcalf 
Table 3.3  Imputed Wage from CEX 
Mean  10.38  8.88 
Standard deviation  9.77  2.86 
25Ih Percentile  5.25  6.91 
50th  Percentile  8.29  8.95 
75Ih  Percentile  13.00  11.50 
N  6,072  1,957 
Source: Wage imputed from information in 1989 CEX household member file. See text for details 
of construction. Col. (2) gives imputed wage from regression in table 3.2 applied to household 
heads in CEX family file. 
in the member file. There is virtually no skew in the distribution. If  it were 
important to model variation in wages across the entire population then this 
would be troubling. However, I will be using mean wages within various age 
groups for purposes of calibrating p so that the lack of skew is less problem- 
atic. Isolating the individuals in the family file who are “young” (age 30-60), 
the mean wage (age) is $10.10 (40.2). 
The final step to constructing a value for w is to compute the marginal tax 
rate on wage income for households in the CEX. I use the NBER TAXSIM tax 
calculator for this purpose. I feed income and household data from the family 
file to TAXSIM and compute a federal tax liability.’O I then recompute the tax 
liability after adding $100 of wage income to the return. The difference in tax 
liabilities divided by  100 is the marginal tax rate on wage income. The median 
tax rate is 15 percent with an interquartile range running from 10.4 to 28 per- 
cent. The correlation between gross wage and tax rate is .46. 
We now have the pieces to estimate values of p. For this two-period model, 
I select households in the CEX sample in which the reference person is be- 
tween ages 30 and 60. I take averages of per capita consumption, leisure, and 
net wage rates across this group. Table 3.4 gives average values, and the re- 
sulting value of p, equals .43. To account for the absence of labor supply in 
the  second period, I set p,  below p, at .33. Parameterizing  the model  as I 
have leads to negligible labor supply elasticities. The uncompensated wage 
elasticity for the young equals -0.07  while the compensated elasticity equals 
0.44. 
3.4  Simulation Results and Sensitivity Analysis 
I now consider the experiment of  switching from a tax on capital income 
and increasing the tax on consumption to maintain revenue neutrality over the 
10. For completeness, I should compute a marginal tax rate using federal and state income tax 
codes. However, it is difficult to impossible to determine the state in which CEX households live. 87  Shift from Income to Consumption Taxation 
Table 3.4  Commodity-Leisure Weight Parameter 
Variable  Average Value 
PI  1 
Wl  8.55 
Ci  12,785 
1,  3,004 
.80 
PI  .43 
N  918 
Source: Averages are taken from 1989 CEX family file for households with reference person in 
age range 30-60  (period one). 
Note: W is the wage net of tax. N is the number of observations in the group. 





































Notes: Results of simulations with p = .25, uI  = 30, u2  = 30, a  = .50, p, = .43, and p,  = .33. 
The consumption tax rate is adjusted to collect the same lifetime tax revenue as under the capital 
income tax. EV, measures the equivalent variation of the change from the income tax expressed 
as a percentage of lifetime resources, while EV, measures equivalent variation as a percentage of 
lifetime discounted tax revenue. 
individual's lifetime." I begin with a tax rate of 25 percent on capital income. 
Table 3.5 presents results. 
Column (1) gives information about consumption, labor supply, and savings 
under the capital income tax. The individual consumes roughly 70 percent of 
first-period income, saving the remaining 30 percent. The large amount of sav- 
11. The issue of revenue neutrality is an important one. Typically policymakers consider revenue 
neutrality in a limited sense, for example over a five-year period. Neutrality here means that the 
present discounted value of tax revenue, discounted at the before-tax return, is unchanged. As 
Summers (1981) has noted, equivalent tax rates on wage and consumption taxation will not neces- 
sarily achieve revenue neutrality in the steady state given the different composition of  savings over 
the lifetime arising from the two different tax systems. 88  Gilbert E. Metcalf 
ing means that a nontrivial consumption tax will be needed to recoup the reve- 
nues lost when capital income is untaxed. 
Column (2) presents a shift to a comprehensive consumption tax. The effect 
of this tax reform is to increase the price of current consumption while decreas- 
ing the price of future consumption. This is borne out by a moderate decrease 
in current consumption (-6  percent) and a large increase in future consump- 
tion (14 percent). 
A consumption tax rate of 9.7 percent suffices to balance the government’s 
budget. There is a modest welfare gain from this reform. Expressed as a frac- 
tion of potential lifetime income, the welfare gain equals 0.19 percent of  in- 
come. Alternatively, the gain is equal to roughly 5 percent of lifetime tax col- 
lections. Perhaps surprisingly, savings falls under this tax reform by over 10 
percent. One of the arguments in favor of a shift to consumption taxation is the 
favorable effects on capital accumulation. For example, Summers (1981) finds 
a highly sensitive response of savings to changes in the tax treatment of capital 
income, which in turn leads to substantial welfare gains from shifting to con- 
sumption taxation. However, there is no theoretical basis for expecting savings 
to rise with a switch from income to consumption taxation (see Feldstein 1978 
for an extended discussion of this point). 
Column (3) increases the initial capital income tax rate from 25 to 50 per- 
cent. Comparing columns (3) and (I), the most significant difference is the 21 
percent drop in second-period consumption. Shifting to a consumption tax 
from a capital income tax leads to a larger percentage increase in future con- 
sumption (relative to the 25 percent capital income tax) and a larger percentage 
drop in current consumption. Doubling the tax rate on capital income leads to 
roughly a quadrupling of the excess burden (expressed as a percentage of  a 
lifetime earnings), as one would expect from the quadratic deadweight loss 
rule.I2 
Concerns about the labor supply effects of a shift from capital income to 
consumption taxation are misplaced if the results from this analysis are correct. 
Labor supply falls somewhat-on  the order of  1-3  percent. The labor supply 
effects seem small relative to the welfare gains from shifting tax bases. 
Table 3.6 presents some sensitivity analyses for the results. The first set indi- 
cates that changes in the intertemporal elasticity parameter (p) can have sig- 
nificant welfare effects. Halving the parameter cuts the welfare gains in half, 
while doubling the parameter doubles the welfare gain. Labor supply is also 
affected. If p equals 0.125, labor supply falls over 4 percent. 
The results are also somewhat sensitive to changes in a,  the intertemporal 
weight parameter. Welfare gains from a shift to consumption taxation fall as 
a  rises, reflecting the lower weight placed on future consumption  (and any 
distortions arising from the capital income tax). Altering IT,  has modest effects 
12. The equivalent variation as a fraction of tax revenue only doubles because the tax revenue 
itself roughly doubles when the capital income tax rate is doubled. 89  Shift from Income to Consumption Taxation 
Table 3.6  Sensitivity Analysis 
P  ci  01  UZ  %AL  E"  I 
.25  SO  .80  .80  -3.4  .78 
.125  SO  .80  .80  -4.4  .35 
SO  SO  .80  .80  -1.8  1.45 
.25  .35  .80  .80  -4.6  34 
.25  .65  .80  .80  -1.7  .35 
.25  .50  .95  .80  -4.0  .87 
.25  SO  .65  .80  -2.4  .72 
Note: Results of simulations corresponding to shifting from a 50 percent capital income tax to a 
consumption tax; PI = .43, p, = .33,  and the interest rate equals 5 percent. 
on labor supply and welfare effects. The welfare gains from the tax shift rise 
with ul,  though the gains are not dramatic.13 
3.5  Narrowing the Tax Base 
One of the main attractions of a consumption tax is the elimination of the 
intertemporal distortion. Table 3.5 suggests that significant welfare gains result 
from the elimination of this distortion. However it comes at the cost of possibly 
creating intracommodity distortions if various items are excluded from the tax 
base. Typically, European VATS exclude housing, food consumed at home, and 
medical care from the tax base. Moreover, in this country much of  personal 
saving is not subject to taxation. According to the most recent Flow of Funds 
report, net acquisition of financial assets in the derivation of personal saving 
equaled $526 billion in 1993. Of that, roughly 65 percent was flows into life 
insurance and pension reserves.L4  On a levels basis, between one-third and one- 
half of all financial assets are held as nontaxable assets. Therefore, a change 
from income to consumption taxation creates the possibility of  generating a 
small intertemporal welfare gain while creating a large intracommodity wel- 
fare loss. I now turn to simulations in which I explore this possibility. 
I modify the utility function in equation (7) above to allow for nontaxed 
consumption goods. The v functions now include taxed (C,)  and nontaxed (DJ 
consumption goods and leisure with share parameters pet, PdL,  and 1 -  p,, - 
pd,,  respectively. The values of p are calibrated in a similar fashion as in equa- 
tion (14) for a VAT  that zero rates food consumed at home, shelter, and medical 
13. Changing u2  has negligible effects on welfare or labor supply. 
14. This likely understates tax-exempt savings. While there was a net decumulation  of tax- 
exempt securities in 1993 ($16 billion), $187 billion was invested in mutual funds, some of which 
was invested in tax-exempt securities.  Overall, mutual funds increased their holdings  of  tax- 
exempt securities by $45 billion in 1993; it is likely that the bulk of  that addition came from the 
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Table 3.7  Consumption Expenditures for Selected Categories in 1989 
Consumer Unit 
Category  Spending ($)  Percentage 
Food at home  2,390  9 
Shelter  4,660  17 
Health care  1,407  5 
All three categories  8,457  30 
Source:  1989 CEX. 
Table 3.8  Zero Rating with a VAT 
Capital  Comprehensive  Partial 
Income  VAT  VAT 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3) 
10,335  9,115 
10,107  13,146 
4,478  3,950 
4,398  5,716 
2,040  1,971 














Nores: Results of simulations wirh p = .25, u,  = 30, u2  = 30,  (Y = .50, p,,  = .30, p,,  = .13, 
p,,  = .23, and pq, = .lo. The consumption tax rate is adjusted to collect same lifetime tax revenue 
as under capital income tax. See table 3.5 for definitions of  EV, and EV,. 
costs. In 1989 these three consumption categories accounted for 30 percent of 
total consumption expenditures (see table 3.7). 
Table 3.8 reports results of  the simulation. Column (1) assumes a capital 
income tax of 50 percent. Prior to the VAT, the commodity that will be subject 
to the partial VAT  accounts for roughly 70 percent of total consumption. The 
share parameters were chosen to generate a 30 percent nontaxable consump- 
tion fraction, with total consumption, labor supply, and savings to correspond 
to column (1) of table 3.5. 
Column (2) of  table 3.8 assumes that all consumption is taxed. Hence the 
results are equivalent to those in column (4) of  table 3.5. A tax rate of  20 
percent suffices to replace the capital income tax. A partial VAT is modeled in 
column (3). 
If  a partial VAT  is employed, the welfare gains from shifting from capital 
income to consumption taxation are reduced by over 30 percent. The equiva- 
lent variation (as a fraction of  lifetime income) falls from 0.78 to 0.52. The 91  Shift from Income to Consumption Taxation 
Table 3.9  Extent of Zero Rating and Welfare 
Percentage of 








66.3  - 
.78  11.75 
.52  7.81 
.15  2.28 
.20  -2.03 
Nore: See table 3.5 for definitions of EV, and EV,. 
aFraction of consumption under the capital income tax that will be untaxed with a shift to a partial 
consumption tax. 
Tax  rate necessary on the taxed commodity to balance the budget. 
tax rate on consumption must now  rise to 31.5 percent to maintain revenue 
neutrality. There is a larger fall in consumption of  the tax good and a small 
increase in the consumption of the untaxed good, particularly in the second 
period. 
Despite the fact that 30 percent of consumption is untaxed (introducing a 
substantial intracommodity distortion), the welfare gains from shifting from 
capital income to partial consumption taxation are still positive and substantial. 
To examine the relative importance of the intracommodity and intertemporal 
distortion, I redid the analysis allowing for increasingly greater fractions of 
consumption to be untaxed. Table 3.9 presents the results. 
If  50 percent of  consumption is untaxed, a tax rate of  48 percent on the 
remaining goods is required to balance the government’s budget. The welfare 
gains from not taxing capital income fall sharply with EV,  dropping from 
11.75 percent (no exclusions) to 2.28 percent. Once excluded consumption ex- 
ceeds 60 percent of total consumption, the capital income tax becomes prefer- 
able from a welfare perspective to a consumption tax. At the untaxed fraction 
of 60 percent, a VAT  rate of 66.3 percent is required to balance the budget and 
there is a welfare loss of 3 percent from the reform. 
These results suggest that the benefits from removing the intertemporal dis- 
tortion swamp any distortions that arise from taxing only a fraction of  con- 
sumption  (unless the  fraction  of  untaxed  consumption exceeds  one-half). 
While  some  sensitivity analysis should be  carried out to  consider the ro- 
bustness of this conclusion, the fact that welfare losses only occur with very 
narrow consumption tax bases suggest that this is not an important distortion 
(relative to the intertemporal distortion). 
Some rough calculations suggest that this is likely to be a robust result. The 
effect of eliminating the capital income tax is to decrease the price of  future 
consumption. Let p,  be the price of future consumption under the capital in- 
come tax andp, the price once the tax is eliminated. Similarly, Ci is the amount 
of future consumption under the capital income tax and Ci the amount once 92  Gilbert E. Metcalf 
the tax is eliminated. An  approximation for the deadweight loss reduced by 
eliminating the tax is given by15 
(15)  ADWL, = 55 (p, -  p,)(Ci -  C,'). 
The price of future consumption equals [l + (1 -  T)~]-~O.  Given an interest 
rate of  5 percent, p1  = 0.48 and pz = 0.23. The price is effectively cut in half 
by  eliminating the capital income tax. What is the effect on future consump- 
tion? The change in saving in the simulations is on the order of  25 percent. 
That is, S, = 0.75Sl. Since S, = p,Ci, 0.23C:  = (0.75)(0.48)C:  = 1.56Ci. 
Therefore, the change in consumption is Ci -  C: = 0.56C;. Consumption in 
the first period in this model is on the order of  70 percent of  income (Y). 
Hence, the change in consumption is approximately -  0.56(0.70Y) = -0.39I: 
Now consider the consumption tax. The former capital income tax collected 
is [(0.23)-' -  (0.48)-l]S1 in future consumption units. Savings is roughly 20 
percent of wage income in the model, yielding tax revenue of roughly 0.45I: 
In present value terms, that equals (0.23)(0.45Y) = 0.1OZ If current consump- 
tion is roughly 70 percent of income, then the consumption tax rate required 
to replace the capital income tax is O.lOY/0.7OY = 14 percent. With a partial 
VAT  covering 70 percent of consumption, the required tax rate would be O.lOY/ 
[(0.70)(0.70Y)] = 20 percent. The deadweight loss associated with the in- 
crease in the partial consumption tax would equal 
Thus, ADWL, = X(0.48 -  0.23)(0.39Y) = -0.049K 
(16)  ADWLc = -'/2  &t2C,, 
where E is the compensated elasticity of demand for consumption. The change 
in the deadweight loss thus equals %(0.20)*(0.49Y)&  = 0.0098cK Assuming a 
demand elasticity of  1, the reduction in deadweight loss from eliminating the 
capital income tax is roughly five times the increased deadweight loss from the 
partial consumption tax. Put slightly differently, the difference in deadweight 
loss between a comprehensive consumption tax and the partial consumption 
tax equals 
%~Y[(0.20)~  (0.49) -  (0.14)*  (0.70)]  = 0.0029~K 
Deadweight loss increases by  about 40 percent with the partial consumption 
tax; however, the magnitudes are quite small relative to the deadweight loss 
from the capital income tax. 
15. Feldstein (1978)  provides an extensive analysis of welfare costs using Harberger deadweight 
loss triangles. As he points out, the formula requires the analysis of the tax system as a whole, and 
separate analysis of each tax component is inappropriate. For my purposes, I am only demonstra- 
ting the relative importance of  the individual components of  a reform rather than rigorously mea- 
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3.6  Conclusion 
Let me begin by noting that this analysis has taken the production side of 
the economy as given. Factor prices and commodity prices are assumed to be 
unaffected by the tax reform. This is clearly unrealistic. A partial consumption 
tax  is likely to lead to an increase in the price for the untaxed commodity 
relative to the price of the tax commodity. This will serve to make the partial 
consumption tax look more like a comprehensive consumption tax and reduce 
the losses arising from the presence of untaxed commodities. 
I began this paper by making two points on the subject of consumption ver- 
sus income taxation. First, labor supply effects-when  they are considered at 
all-are  generally thought to be negative with a consumption tax. The shift 
from income to consumption taxation involves a narrowing of the tax base and 
the effective tax on wage income must rise. However, as I have shown, labor 
supply effects are likely to be quite small, and moreover, labor supply can 
increase or decrease in response to a shift to consumption taxation. 
The second point that I have  made in this paper is that the welfare gains 
from a shift to consumption taxation may be overstated if there is only partial 
taxation of  consumption. However, the reduction in gains from partial con- 
sumption taxation are not very large, and over plausible ranges of parameter 
estimates, the gains from removing the intertemporal distortion exceed the 
losses from the intracommodity distortion. 
Overall, there are two reassuring messages that come out of this paper for 
supporters of consumption taxation. First, a shift from income to consumption 
taxation is not likely to have large adverse labor supply effects. Second, the 
welfare losses from partial consumption taxation are relatively unimportant 
compared to the gains from removing the intertemporal distortion. While there 
are many good reasons to avoid zero rating and exemption of goods in a con- 
sumption tax, welfare reasons are not paramount. Administrative and distribu- 
tional concerns are likely to loom much larger than welfare concerns. 
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Comment  GV  Burtless 
Many economists-and  a smaller number of politicians-favor  replacing the 
present income tax system with a partial or comprehensive tax on household 
consumption. The claimed advantages of a consumption tax include a reduc- 
tion in  the distortion of consumers’ allocation decision between consuming 
today and consuming in the future. Because it taxes the return on savings, an 
income tax  favors current  over deferred consumption. A  consumption tax 
would reduce or eliminate this distortion. 
Gilbert Metcalf examines the potential effect of a consumption tax on labor 
supply, saving, and consumer well-being within a stylized model of consumer 
behavior. The effects of the tax are measured relative to those of a capital in- 
come tax that raises the same amount of  revenue over each consumer’s life 
span. In comparison with an income tax, the consumption tax induces consum- 
ers to work less and save less. It also improves consumer welfare because 
agents are permitted to allocate consumption across different periods of their 
lives without tax penalty. 
Metcalf‘s conclusions rest on several clearly stated assumptions. Individuals 
are assumed to live for two periods and to consume completely their net life- 
time incomes by the time they expire. That is, they do not share their incomes 
with relatives, nor do they leave bequests. Their consumption and labor supply 
over the two periods of their lives are determined by a time-separable constant 
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elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function. Metcalf assumes the values of 
the critical variables in this utility function or infers their values based on ob- 
served consumption and labor supply patterns in the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). To simplify the analysis, the author also 
assumes that individuals do not work during the second period of their lives. 
This is not entirely consistent with evidence in the CEX, which suggests that 
nearly a third of  older family heads are employed and that employed older 
people work approximately two-thirds as much as younger workers. I doubt 
that Metcalf's simplification leads to a major distortion in his qualitative re- 
sults, given the other assumptions in his model. 
The other assumptions of the model are clearly open to question, however. 
The substantial amount of work effort among a minority of older CEX respon- 
dents reflects  a  substantial diversity  in  individual circumstances (such as 
wealth and labor market opportunities) and individual preferences (i.e., utility 
functions). Metcalf's analysis ignores the diversity in circumstances and pref- 
erences to focus on the response of a representative agent, who is assigned a 
wage and preference function that is thought to reflect the population average. 
I suspect that the main limitation in this study for practical policy making is 
its focus on a single representative agent. Population responses may differ from 
those of  a single representative agent because some groups in the population 
are almost certainly more responsive to taxation than others. If  the most re- 
sponsive groups are also ones that have a high wage or an exceptional propen- 
sity to save, the economy-wide effects of a tax change will not be accurately 
reflected by the responses of a single representative member of the population 
who has average characteristics and preferences. However, Metcalf's focus per- 
mits us to see clearly how aspects of the tax system and the individual prefer- 
ence function can affect individual welfare and behavioral response. 
The sensitivity analysis shown in tables 3.5, 3.6, 3.8, and 3.9 is straightfor- 
ward  and illuminating. Compared with a capital income tax that raises the 
same discounted revenue over each taxpayer's life span, a consumption tax 
reduces labor supply. The intuition behind this result is plain. In Metcalf's 
model a consumption tax is equivalent to a tax on wages, so workers are mod- 
estly discouraged from working. Because the assumed labor supply elasticity 
is very low, however, the reduction in labor supply is small, so Metcalf finds 
only a small decline in lifetime earnings. 
The consumption tax also yields a reduction in first-period consumption and 
saving, in large measure because it increases tax burdens in the first period. 
The wage earner has less net income in the first period to divide between con- 
sumption and saving. However, the worker has more net income in the second 
period, and hence she consumes more in that period than she would under 
a capital income tax. When consumers are permitted to allocate freely their 
consumption between the two periods without special tax penalty, they choose 
to defer consumption to the second period. The improvement in consumers' 
welfare from this reallocation of consumption between periods more than off- 96  Gilbert E.  Metcalf 
sets the loss of  welfare from reduced lifetime earnings, yielding an improve- 
ment in consumer well-being. Metcalf's sensitivity analyses suggest that this 
improvement will likely remain even if  the consumption tax is not uniform 
across commodities. However, this conclusion is probably sensitive to changes 
in preference parameters about which economists know little. 
As noted in the paper, these results do not come out of a general equilibrium 
model that includes the production side of the economy. Workers reduce their 
labor supply and saving under a consumption tax, so it would be surprising if 
the economy could produce as much output as under an income tax. Nor does 
the paper consider the formidable problem of shifting from an  income tax to a 
consumption tax system. In Metcalf's stylized model it might seem feasible to 
impose a consumption tax starting with a particular cohort, rather than impos- 
ing it on all generations at the same time. This simple solution to the transition 
problem is not available to policymakers, because most taxpayers' life spans 
last longer than two periods. A transition rule that is fair to retired 70-year-olds 
and to 20-year-olds just entering the labor force may not be fair to 50-year- 
olds who have  accumulated assets under an income tax system for 30 years 
and face the prospect of working for 15 additional years and drawing retire- 
ment benefits for 20 years under a consumption tax system. Any transition rule 
will create winners and losers. Practical efforts to minimize the number of 
losers or the size of their losses may involve imposing burdens on taxpayers 
who cannot vote, namely, future workers who are left with a larger public debt. 
The paper is convincing in showing the long-run advantages of a consump- 
tion tax under sensible assumptions. Even a consumption tax involves distor- 
tions, of course. The tax is imposed on goods and services that are purchased 
in the market, but it exempts goods and services produced in the home as well 
as leisure consumption. Decisions about home production and labor supply 
behavior will therefore be distorted by  a consumption tax just as they are by 
an income tax. In addition, as Metcalf points out, almost no existing consump- 
tion tax is uniformly imposed on all goods and services. Some market goods 
and services are more lightly taxed than others; some goods and services are 
exempt from taxes altogether. Thus, consumption taxes that are politically fea- 
sible may  cause distortions in budget  allocation across different classes of 
commodities, even though they lessen the distortion in allocations across time 
periods. 
As  actually implemented in  current tax law,  the income tax introduces a 
comparable distortion. Different classes of income are subject to differing tax 
rates. Imputed rent on owner-occupied homes and unrealized gains on capital 
income are exempt from the income tax. Employer contributions to medical 
insurance are also untaxed. Several forms of  capital income, in addition to 
unrealized capital gains, are lightly taxed in  comparison with  an identical 
stream of  money wages. For example, assets held in qualified pension plans, 
401  (k) plans, and individual retirement accounts (IRAs) generate returns that 
are untaxed until withdrawals from the plan begin sometime during retirement. 97  Shift from Income to Consumption Taxation 
Like a consumption tax which imposes differing rates on different classes 
of commodities, an income tax that imposes differing rates on different classes 
of income can distort agents’ behavior. Actual income tax systems favor certain 
kinds of  income-generating activities over others, just as most implemented 
consumption tax systems favor certain kinds of  consumption over others. In 
the case of  the U.S. income tax, two of  the most costly tax preferences are 
aimed at boosting particular forms of household saving. The preferences to 
encourage home ownership and qualified pension plans are expensive to the 
Treasury, but they may  induce taxpayers to save more in their homes and in 
company pension plans than taxpayers would save under an income tax system 
in which all forms of income were subject to a uniform tax rate. 
In fact, of course, the present U.S.  income tax contains elements of a con- 
sumption tax as well as an income tax. The tax preference for pensions ex- 
empts contributions to pension plans and income earned in the plans from 
taxes until money is withdrawn in retirement. For workers who are contribut- 
ing less to pension plans than allowed by their employer and by current law, 
the present income tax system causes no distortion in the intertemporal alloca- 
tion of resources. Workers are free at the margin to increase their consumption 
in old age without any special tax penalty. The specific income-tax-induced 
distortion treated in this paper is not relevant in this case. The number of work- 
ers who can make additional tax-preferred contributions to pension plans is 
very large since many workers do not make the largest allowed contribution to 
401(k) or IRA plans. Even those workers who cannot make additional tax- 
preferred contributions to pension plans are less constrained than it may  ap- 
pear. Workers with a strong preference for deferring compensation into the 
future have the option of seeking an employer who offers a pay package with 
less current money compensation and more deferred compensation. While it is 
more costly for workers to find employers offering the optimal mix of current 
and deferred compensation than it is for them to allocate their consumption 
under a consumption tax, the present income tax system certainly offers work- 
ers rich opportunities for deferring taxes on compensation until the compensa- 
tion is used for consumption. In view of  this feature of  the U.S. income tax, 
the welfare gains of moving to a comprehensive consumption tax are likely to 
be noticeably smaller than suggested in this paper. 